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Justifying Academic Freedom
Brian L. Frye*
In his “thesis book,” Versions of Academic Freedom: From
Professionalism to Revolution, Stanley Fish identifies five theories of
academic freedom. The professional theory argues that academic freedom
gives academics the right to exercise their discretion within academic
norms. The common good theory argues that it helps academics contribute
to the common good by advancing democratic values. The exceptionalism
theory argues that it allows academics to correct popular opinion by
expressing their exceptional knowledge. The critique theory argues that it
enables academics to question academic norms by protecting
dissent. Lastly, the revolution theory argues that it permits academics to
reject academic norms in order to advance social justice.
Fish adopts the professional theory of academic freedom on the ground
that the purpose of academia is to produce disinterested inquiry, and that
academic norms force academics to remain disinterested. He rejects the
other theories of academic freedom because they assume that the purpose of
academia is something other than disinterested inquiry. According to Fish,
the purpose of academia is not to contribute to the common good, correct
popular opinion, question academic norms, or advance social
justice. Rather, the purpose of academia is to produce scholarship
according to academic norms.
On balance, I agree with Fish. The purpose of academia is to produce
scholarship. But I fear that he overstates his case by arguing that academia
can only be evaluated in relation to academic norms:
[E]ither elevating the task by attaching it to some exalted moral or
political imperative or instrumentalizing it by tying its value to an
imported set of justifications (it helps the economy, or improves the
quality of national life, or fashions the character of civic-minded
citizens) brings confusion rather than clarity to the project of
understanding and defending academic freedom.1
In other words, scholarship is an end in itself, rather than a means to an end,
and academic freedom is simply the freedom to produce scholarship
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consistent with academic norms.
Fish cheerfully concedes the circularity of his argument, but insists
that “[d]escription and justification require circularity if the raison d’etre of
the enterprise is to be honored.”2 According to Fish, academic freedom can
only be defined by academic norms because social practices cannot be
described or justified in extrinsic terms without distortion. For that reason,
he rejects the argument that scholarship must “rest on a foundation of
objectivity, truth and independent evidence”3 as a normative claim about
how academics should evaluate scholarship, rather than as a description of
how they actually behave.
While Fish correctly rejects the argument that scholarship must be
objective, he does so based on a false premise. Social practices cannot be
described in extrinsic terms, but they can be justified by extrinsic
terms. For example, tort law cannot adequately be described as a method of
improving efficiency, but it can properly be justified on those
terms. Indeed, if tort law fails to improve efficiency, we ought to question
its justification, or at least its governing norms.
Likewise, while academic freedom can only be described in relation to
academic norms, its justification can and should depend on its contribution
to the common good. Academics contribute to the common good by
producing scholarship. But scholarship is a means to an end, not an end in
itself. Academic freedom is justified not only because enables academics to
produce more and better scholarship, but also because it enables academics
to challenge academic norms that diminish the quantity or quality of
scholarship they produce.
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